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Odd-parity error rejection (OPER) can drastically improve the asymptotic key rate of sending-or-
not-sending twin-field (SNS-TF) quantum key distribution (QKD). However, in practice, the finite
key effects have to be considered for security. Here, we propose a zigzag approach to verify the
phase-flip error of the survived bits after OPER. Based on this, we can take all the finite key effect
efficiently in calculating the non-asymptotic key rate. Numerical simulation shows that our method
here produces the highest key rate over all distances among all existing methods, improving the
key rate by more than 100% to 3000% in comparison with different prior art methods with typical
experimental setting. Also, we show that with the method here, the SNS-TF QKD can by far break
the the absolute bound of repeater-less key rate with whatever detection efficiency. We can even
reach a non-asymptotic key rate more than 40 times of the practical bound and 13 times of the
absolute bound with 1012 pulses. Besides, we apply the McDiarmid inequality to estimate the phase
flip error rate, further improving the key rate by more than 20%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1–8] can provide secure private communication between two remote parties Alice
and Bob . In the recent years, the efficiency and security of QKD in practice have been extensively studied, e.g., very
recently, the important idea named in Twin-Field (TF) QKD [9], and its variants [10–23].
The security proof under ideal conditions does not directly apply to the practical QKD where imperfect devices such
as the weak coherent state (WCS) sources or the imperfect detectors such as avalanche photodiode detectors (APDs)
are used [24–31]. The decoy-state method [32–34] can assure the security of the QKD protocol with imperfect sources
and maintain the high key rate, and thus attracts many studies on both theories [35–41] and experiments [42–52].
Besides decoy-state method, there are other protocols such as RRDPS protocol [53, 54] proposed to beat photon-
number-splitting (PNS) attack. Measurement-Device-Independent (MDI)-QKD [55, 56] was proposed to solve all
possible detection loopholes. The decoy-state MDI-QKD can assure the security with imperfect sources and detectors,
and thus has been widely studied [57–71].
The very recently proposed TF QKD [9], together with its variants [10–23], changes the key rate into square root
scale of channel transmittance. The protocol can break the repeater-less key rate limit such as the TGW bound [72]
presented by Takeoka, Guha, and Wilde, and the PLOB bound [73] established by Pirandola, Laurenza, Ottaviani, and
Banchi, which will be used in this work. The well-known PLOB bound also corresponds to the secret key capacity of
the lossy communication channel. Experiments [74–78] have been done to demonstrate those protocols. In particular,
the efficient variant of TF QKD, named in sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol has been proposed in Ref. [10]. The
SNS protocol has its advantage of tolerating large misalignment errors [10, 16] and unconditional security with finite
pulses [19]. The numerical results show that the secure distance can exceed 500 km even when the misalignment error
is as large as 20% [19]. The SNS protocol has been experimentally demonstrated in proof-of-principle in Ref. [74],
and realized in real optical fiber with the finite key effects being taken into consideration [75].
However, there are still considerable spaces to further improve the performance of the SNS protocol. For example,
the original SNS protocol [10, 16, 19] is limited to small probability of sending a signal coherent state and this limits
its key rate.
The two-way communication method, with odd-parity error rejection (OPER) can be applied to SNS protocol and
thus increases the probability of sending the signal coherent state [20]. This method can improve the asymptotic
key rate and secure distance of SNS protocol drastically. However, there are only finite pulses and finite intensities
in practice and we need to consider the finite key effects. In this article, we study the the finite key effects for the
SNS protocol with OPER. Extensive comparisons among different protocols show that the key rate simulated by the
2method of this work presents the highest key rate known so far if we assume a reasonable finite size of the key. It
presents advantageous results by more than 2 to 30 times of the prior art results. Besides, we apply the improved
version of McDiarmid inequality [79] to the estimating of phase-flip error rate, which can reduce the effect of statistical
fluctuation and further improve the key rate especially when the key size is small. Also, we show that with the method
here, the SNS-TF QKD can by far break the absolute key rate limit of the repeater-less QKD. We can even reach a
non-asymptotic key rate more than 13 times of this absolute limit.
Breaking the repeater-less key-rate limit is the most fascinating property of the TF-QKD. In practice, there are lot
of constraints. We set the following conditions for practical QKD results that unconditionally break the repeater-less
key rate limit:
1. The protocol itself must be secure.
2. A reasonable finite size of the key should be assumed and the finite key effects should be considered in calculation.
3. The actual key rate should break the absolute PLOB bound [80], which upper bounds the repeater-less key rate
given whatever local devices, including the perfect detection devices.
For this goal, we need to consider the finite key effects and we need to show a high key rate exceeding the absolute
PLOB bound.
Before going into further details, let us first briefly review the OPER and see why the problem of finite key effects
is not straightforward. To improve the performance, we can apply the bit-flip error rejection in the SNS protocol.
Say, Alice and Bob group their raw bits two by two. To each group of two-bits, they compare the parity values. They
discard both bits of the group when they have different parity values for the group and they discard one bit and keep
another bit in the group if they have the same parity values for the group. After error rejection, the bit-flip rate is
expected to be reduced but the phase-flip error rate is normally increased. Moreover, due to the structure of SNS
protocol, the bit-flip errors rise if we raise the sending probability. As was shown in [20], it will be more efficient in
reducing bit-flip errors if we only use odd parity events in the error rejection, and we name this as odd-parity error
rejection (OPER). In the SNS protocol, all bit-flip errors come from tagged bits. There is no bit-flip error for those
untagged bits, so the phase-flip error rate is iterated by the following formula [81, 82]:
e′1 = 2e1(1− e1), (1)
where e1 is the phase-flip error rate of those raw untagged bits before error rejection and e
′
1 is the phase-flip error
rate for those survived untagged bits after error rejection.
Note that this iteration formula is the averaged value of phase-flip error rate for the survived untagged bits from
both odd-parity groups and even parity groups. However, we cannot blindly use this iteration formula for the phase-
flip error rate for survived untagged bits from odd-parity groups alone, because the phase-flip error rates of survived
untagged bits from odd parity is in general different from that of even-parity groups. For example, consider the virtual
protocol that Alice and Bob share many entangled pair states with each pair in the state |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + eiφ|11〉),
where 0 and 1 mean qubit 0 and 1, and the first qubit belongs to Alice and the second qubit belongs to Bob. The
random grouping of two untested bits in the real protocol is now related to the random grouping of two pair states in
the virtual protocol. According to Ref. [83], the operators of OPER are
OˆA =|0〉A〈0|A〈1|A + |1〉A〈1|A〈0|A,
OˆB =|0〉B〈0|B〈1|B + |1〉B〈1|B〈0|B.
(2)
The subscript A means it acts on Alice’s qubit and subscript B means it acts on Bob’s qubit. And the operators of
even-parity error rejection are
Oˆ′A =|0′〉A〈0|A〈0|A + |1′〉A〈1|A〈1|A,
Oˆ′B =|0′〉B〈0|B〈0|B + |1′〉B〈1|B〈1|B.
(3)
After error rejection, the state of odd-parity is
|odd〉 = OˆAOˆB|Ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψ〉√
〈Ψ| ⊗ 〈Ψ|Oˆ†BOˆ†AOˆAOˆB|Ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψ〉
=
eiφ√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉),
and the state of even-parity is
|even〉 = Oˆ
′
AOˆ
′
B|Ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψ〉√
〈Ψ| ⊗ 〈Ψ|Oˆ′†BOˆ′†AOˆ′AOˆ′B|Ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψ〉
=
1√
2
(|0′0′〉+ e2iφ|1′1′〉).
3This shows that the phase-flip error rate after parity check is dependent on the parity value of the group: 0 for odd
parity and 2 sin2 φ for even parity [20]. In general, the iteration formula does not have to hold for our OPER method,
which shall only use survived bits from odd-parity group. Luckily, we have shown by de Finetti theorem that after
error rejection, the phase-flip error rate of survived untagged bits from odd-parity groups can never be larger than
those from even-parity groups, in the limit of infinite number of raw pairs initially [20]. However, in a real protocol,
we never have infinite number of raw pairs. Since we have used de Finetti theorem, there is no straightforward
calculation to take the finite key effects efficiently. If we choose to directly apply the collective-attack model, it will
cost a lot of bits in lifting the collective-attack security to coherent-attack security [84]. For example, we need to use
a failure probability value of the statistical fluctuation as small as 10−100. Given this request, the final key rate is
actually smaller than that of the existing SNS protocol, and, the final key rate can even be 0 if the data size is not
unreasonably small. Here we shall give a more efficient way for the issue and present advantageous results with the
method with normal, reasonable data size. To do so, we shall first use the Zigzag approach to faithfully bound the
phase-flip error rate for those survived untagged bits after OPER. Then we can efficiently take all finite key effects in
calculating the finial key.
This paper is arranged as follows. In Sec. II we present our Zigzag approach to estimate the phase-flip iterative
with explicit formulas. In Sec. III, we review the SNS protocol and show how to apply the formulas got in Sec. II to
the SNS protocol. In Sec. IV, we show how to apply the OPER method to the asymmetric SNS protocol. In Sec. V,
we present our numerical simulation results and compare key rates of different methods. The article ends with some
concluding remarks. The details of some calculations are shown in the appendix.
II. ZIGZAG APPROACH TO PHASE-FLIP ERROR RATE AFTER OPER
A. Mathematical toolbox and main idea.
For clarity, we first consider the virtual protocol where Alice and Bob share raw entanglement pairs. There is no
bit-flip error of all these pairs. After phase-flip error test, they share 2n+k of raw entanglement pairs. They randomly
choose 2n pairs for final key distillation and the left k pairs would be neglected. Denote the state of these 2n pairs
by ρ2n. According to the exponential de Finettis representation theorem [85, 86], mathematically, there exists an
associate state ρ˜2n of state ρ2n which satisfies the following conditions:
i) The trace distance between ρ2n and ρ˜2n is bounded by
‖ρ2n − ρ˜2n‖ ≤ ε(r, k) = 3kde−rk/(2n+k), (4)
and ii), state ρ˜2n is in the following form:
ρ˜2n =
∫
Pσρ
2n
σ dσ =
∫
Pσσ
⊗2n−r ⊗ ρ˜rσdσ. (5)
This is to say, it is a state of probabilistic mixture of approximate independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
states. The state ρ2nσ is called
(
2n
2n−r
)
-i.i.d. state, as only 2n− r subsystems of ρ2nσ are i.i.d. and the state ρ˜rσ is an
arbitrary state on r subsystems. For the case we consider here, there is no bit-flip error of raw entanglement pairs,
thus the dimension of each subsystem is d = 2. ε(r, k) decreases exponentially fast in rk. For the practical case, we
can set ε(r, k) = 10−13 or smaller.
The probability distribution of the number of phase error m, of state ρ2n, could be observed if a positive operator
valued measurement (POVM) {Eˆm} was performed [87]. Actually, pm is just a pure mathematical quantity defined
by
{pm = tr(ρ2nEˆm)} (6)
where Eˆm is the projection operator projecting any state of the 2n pairs to the subspaceM where the number of phase-
flip errors for any state takes value m deterministically. Mathematically, we also have the probability distribution
qm for the number of phase error m, of state ρ˜
2n, which is {qm = tr(ρ˜2nEˆm)}. According to the property of trace
distance, we have ∑
m
|pm − qm| ≤ 2ε(r, k), (7)
which means the probability distributions of the number of phase error of those two states are almost the same except
with a small probability 2ε(r, k).
4To do OPER, they randomly group those 2n pairs two by two. For each group of pairs, Alice (Bob) performs the
measurement of {OˆA, Oˆ′A} ({OˆB, Oˆ′B}) to her (his) qubits. Since there is no bit-flip error in the raw pairs, only the
operators OˆAOˆB and Oˆ
′
AOˆ
′
B would be succeed. And only the results of the operator OˆAOˆB would be kept for further
key distillation. This completes the OPER. Those pairs after OPER are named as survived pairs. One can measure
the number of phase-flip errors ms of those survived pairs. Physically, there also exists a POVM {Eˆ′m} which can be
taken directly on the initial 2n pairs to present the value ms. The existence of such a POVM can be easily proven.
Therefore, we can also use the probability distributions of ms for state ρ
2n and ρ˜2n, respectively. We denote the
probability distribution of ms by {p′ms = tr(ρ2nEˆ′m)} and {q′ms = tr(ρ˜2nEˆ′m)}. Similar to Eq. (7), we have∑
ms
|p′ms − q′ms | ≤ 2ε(r, k). (8)
Remark: Values of {pm, qm, p′ms , q′ms} present important mathematical properties of states ρ2n and ρ˜2n. We shall
make use of constraints on these values to finally upper bound the phase-flip error rate e′ph1 for survived pairs after
OPER.
Definition 1. We define Pr
D
(x ≥ x¯) = ∑x≥x¯ PrD (x), where {PrD (x)} is a probability distribution labelled by D
({Pr
D
(x)} is actually just a probability distribution of the discrete variable x, but too many probability distributions
are used in the following proof, thus we define such a symbol to clearly show everything more intuitively and vividly
by choosing the labelling symbol D properly. In choosing labelling symbol D, we shall try to always use a symbol
characterize the main properties for the probability distribution it labels. Of course every time when we use a
different labelling D, we shall always note it clearly that the explicit probability distribution it labels.). For example,
Pr
{pm}
(m ≥ m¯) =∑m≥m¯ pm.
Here is our main idea in bounding the value of e′ph1 , the phase-flip error rate from those survived bits after OPER.
Our goal can be reached once we find tight bound on values of {p′ms}.
1. According to the phase-flip error test in the very beginning [19, 67, 88], we can find that the probability for m ≥ M¯
is less than εe, where m is the number of phase-flip errors from those 2n pairs in state ρ
2n. On the other hand, this
probability is just
∑
m≥M pm. Therefore we can constrain values of {pm} by
Pr
{pm}
(m ≥M) ≤ εe. (9)
2. Since the trace distance between ρ2n and its associate state ρ˜2n is small, with Eqs. (7) and (9), we can further
restrict values of {qm} by
Pr
{qm}
(m ≥M) ≤ εe + 2ε(r, k). (10)
3. With this, we can constrain values of {q′ms} based on the fact that ρ˜2n is the probabilistic mixture of approximate
i.i.d. state. Suppose we have
Pr
{q′
ms
}
(ms ≥Ms) ≤ ε˜s, (11)
where Ms is an estimated value and ε˜s is the corresponding failure probability.
4. Again, since the trace distance between ρ2n and its associate state ρ˜2n is small, with the bounded result in step 3,
we can now restrict values of {p′ms} by Eqs. (8) and (11), which is
Pr
{p′
ms
}
(ms ≥Ms) ≤ ε˜s + 2ε(r, k) = εs. (12)
5. Finally, with constraint on {p′ms} in step 4, we can get the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate e′ph1 with a
failure probability εs, which is
e′ph1 =
Ms
n′1
, (13)
where n′1 is the number of survived pairs after OPER.
Among all values and failure probability appeared in Eqs. (7-11), M and εe could be get from the phase-flip error
test in the very beginning [19, 67, 88], and ε(r, k) is set as we wanted. The only unknown values are Ms and ε˜s. Our
task is now reduced to find the explicit values of Ms and its corresponding failure probability ε˜s.
5B. The values of M¯s and its corresponding failure probability ε˜s
Lemma 1 Let {Pr
c1
(x1)} be an a1-fold Bernoulli distribution where the success probability of obtaining outcome ′1′ of
every Bernoulli trial is c1. Let {PrD2(x2)} be an arbitrary probability distribution on a2 random variables with outcomes′0′ or ′1′ and a2 ≤ a1. Let x be a new discrete variable which satisfies x = x1 + x2, and we denote the probability
distribution of x as {Pr
D
(x)}. Then we have
Pr
D
(x ≥ x¯) ≥ Pr
c1
(x1 ≥ x¯),
Pr
D
(x ≥ x¯) ≤ Pr
c1
(x1 ≥ x¯− a2),
(14)
where x¯ is a specific value in [a2, a1].
Proof According to the definition of Pr
D
(x ≥ x¯), we have
Pr
D
(x ≥ x¯) =
a2∑
x2=0
Pr
D2
(x2)
a1∑
x1=x¯−x2
Pr
c1
(x1). (15)
And obviously, we have
a1∑
x1=x¯−x2
Pr
c1
(x1) ≥
a1∑
x1=x¯
Pr
c1
(x1),
a1∑
x1=x¯−x2
Pr
c1
(x1) ≤
a1∑
x1=x¯−a2
Pr
c1
(x1).
(16)
Combine Eqs. (15,16) and the fact that
∑a2
x2=0
Pr
D2
(x2) = 1, we can get Eq. (14). This ends the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 shows that if a1 ≫ a2, the statistical property of x is almost determined by its i.i.d. part x1. This also
is the original intention of exponential de Finettis representation theorem [85, 86].
Lemma 2 Let {Pr
c1
(x1)} be an a1-fold Bernoulli distribution where the success probability of obtaining outcome ′1′ of
every Bernoulli trial is c1. Let {Pr
c2
(x1)} be an a1-fold Bernoulli distribution where the success probability of obtaining
outcome ′1′ of every Bernoulli trial is c2. If c1 ≥ c2, we have
Pr
c1
(x1 ≥ x¯) ≥ Pr
c2
(x1 ≥ x¯) (17)
where x¯ is a specific value in [0, a1].
Proof Lemma 2 is a directed conclusion of binomial distribution.
The state σ of a subsystem in ρ2nσ is a 2-dimensional state, which can be express as
σ =cos2 θ|00〉〈00|+ sin2 θ|11〉〈11|+ αe−iβ |11〉〈00|+ αeiβ |00〉〈11|, (18)
where 0 and 1 mean qubit 0 and 1, and the first qubit belongs to Alice and the second qubit belongs to Bob. θ, α, β
are three arbitrary real numbers and satisfy
α2 ≤ sin2 θ cos2 θ. (19)
Lemma 3 Let 〈eσ〉 be the probability that an error occurs if Alice and Bob measures their qubit of state σ in X basis.
Let 〈Eσ〉 be the probability that an error occurs if Alice and Bob measures their qubit in X basis after OPER performed
on σ⊗2 (the detail of the definition of 〈Eσ〉 is shown in Eq. (24)). Let e¯ be a specific value in [0, 0.5]. If 〈eσ〉 ≤ e¯, we
have
〈Eσ〉 ≤ e¯(1− e¯). (20)
Proof We have proof Lemma 3 in Ref.[20]. For completeness, we write the proof again.
According to the definition of 〈eσ〉, we have
〈eσ〉 = tr(Mˆ1σMˆ †1 + Mˆ2σMˆ †2 ) =
1
2
(1 − 2α cosβ), (21)
6where
Mˆ1 = |+〉A〈+|A ⊗ |−〉B〈−|B,
Mˆ2 = |−〉A〈−|A ⊗ |+〉B〈+|B,
(22)
and
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
(23)
With the operator defined in Eq. (2), we have
〈Eσ〉 =tr(Mˆ1OˆAOˆBσ⊗2Oˆ†BOˆ†AMˆ †1 + Mˆ2OˆAOˆBσ⊗2Oˆ†BOˆ†AMˆ †2 )
= sin2 θ cos2 θ − α2.
(24)
Directly, with Eqs. (21) and (24), we have
〈Eσ〉 ≤ 〈eσ〉(1 − 〈eσ〉) ≤ e¯(1− e¯). (25)
This ends the proof of Lemma 3.
The state ρ2nσ is composed by two independent parts: one part is the i.i.d. state σ
⊗2n−r and the other part is an
arbitrary state ρ˜rσ. If Alice and Bob measure the phase error of ρ
2n
σ , and the outcome of the number of phase error is
m, then m is also composed by two parts m = m1+m2 where m1 is the number of phase error of state σ
⊗2n−r and m2
is the number of phase error of state ρ˜rσ. We denote the probability distribution of the number of phase error of state
ρ2nσ as {PrDσr(m)} and the probability distribution of the number of phase error of state ρ˜
r
σ as {PrDr(m2)}. Obviously,
the probability distribution of the number of phase error of state σ⊗2n−r is a (2n − r)-fold Bernoulli distribution
where the success probability of obtaining outcome ′1′ of every Bernoulli trial is 〈eσ〉, and we denote this probability
distribution as { Pr
〈eσ〉
(m1)}.
Theorem 1 Let Pr
〈eτ 〉
(m1 ≥ M) = ξτ where { Pr〈eτ 〉(m1)} is a (2n − r)-fold Bernoulli distribution where the success
probability of obtaining outcome ′1′ of every Bernoulli trial is 〈eτ 〉, we have
P1 =
∫
σ∈{σ:〈eσ〉≥〈eτ 〉}
Pσdσ ≤ εe + 2ε(r, k)
ξτ
. (26)
Proof
Pr
{qm}
(m ≥M) =
∫
Pσ PrDσr
(m ≥M)dσ
≥
∫
σ∈{σ:〈eσ〉≥〈eτ 〉}
Pσ PrDσr
(m ≥M)dσ
≥
∫
σ∈{σ:〈eσ〉≥〈eτ 〉}
Pσ Pr〈eσ〉
(m1 ≥M)dσ
≥
∫
σ∈{σ:〈eσ〉≥〈eτ 〉}
Pσ Pr〈eτ 〉
(m1 ≥M)dσ
=P1ξτ ,
where we apply Lemma 1 for the second inequality and apply Lemma 2 for the third inequality. Combine with Eq. (10),
we have P1ξτ ≤ εe + 2ε(r, k). This ends the proof of Theorem 1.
For the state ρ2nσ , the OPER process be regarded as independently happening in two individual states: one is the
state σ⊗2n−2r and the other is the state σ⊗r ⊗ ρ˜rσ. If Alice and Bob measure the phase error of ρ2nσ after OPER, and
the outcome of the number of phase error is ms, then ms is composed by two parts ms = ms1 +ms2 where ms1 is
the number of phase error of state σ⊗2n−2r after OPER and ms2 is the number of phase error of state σ⊗r ⊗ ρ˜rσ after
OPER. We denote the probability distribution of the number of phase error of state ρ2nσ after OPER as {PrD′
σr
(ms)}
7and the probability distribution of the number of phase error of state σ⊗r ⊗ ρ˜rσ after OPER as {PrD′
r
(ms2)}. Obviously,
the probability distribution of the number of phase error of state σ⊗2n−2r after OPER is a (n − r)-fold Bernoulli
distribution where the success probability of obtaining outcome ′1′ of every Bernoulli trial is 〈Eσ〉, and we denote this
probability distribution as { Pr
〈Eσ〉
(ms1)}.
Theorem 2 Let 〈Eτ 〉 = 〈eτ 〉(1 − 〈eτ 〉), and { Pr〈Eτ〉(ms1)} be a (n − r)-fold Bernoulli distribution where the success
probability of obtaining outcome ′1′ of every Bernoulli trial is 〈Eτ 〉. And let ξ˜τ andMs satisfy Pr〈Eτ〉(ms1 ≥Ms−r) = ξ˜τ .
We have
Pr
{q′
ms
}
(ms ≥Ms) ≤ ε˜s = ξ˜τ + [1− ξ˜τ ]εe + 2ε(r, k)
ξτ
. (27)
Proof
Pr
{q′
ms
}
(ms ≥Ms) =
∫
Pσ PrD′
σr
(ms ≥Ms)dσ
≤
∫
Pσ Pr〈Eσ〉
(ms1 ≥Ms − r)dσ
≤
∫
σ∈{σ:〈eσ〉≤〈eτ 〉}
Pσ Pr〈Eσ〉
(ms1 ≥Ms − r)dσ + P1
≤
∫
σ∈{σ:〈eσ〉≤〈eτ 〉}
Pσ Pr〈Eτ 〉
(ms1 ≥Ms − r)dσ + P1
= (1− P1)ξ˜τ + P1,
where we apply Lemma 1 for the first inequality, apply the fact that all probabilities are less than or equal to 1 for the
second inequality, and apply Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 for the third inequality. Combine with Theorem 1, we have
Pr
{q′
ms
}
(ms ≥Ms) ≤ ξ˜τ + [1− ξ˜τ ]εe + 2ε(r, k)
ξτ
. (28)
This ends the proof of Theorem 2.
With Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we can calculate a group of (Ms, εs) that satisfies Eq. (12). For example,
if we have known a group of (M, εe) that satisfies Eq. (9), we can set ξτ = 10
−2, ξ˜τ = 10−10. By solving the
equation Pr
〈eτ 〉
(m1 ≥ M) = 10−2, we can get the value of 〈eτ 〉. With the definition 〈Eτ 〉 = 〈eτ 〉(1 − 〈eτ 〉), by
solving the equation Pr
〈Eτ 〉
(ms1 ≥ Ms − r) = 10−10, we can get the value of Ms. Approximately, we have εs =
10−10 + 102[εe + 2ε(r, k)] + 2ε(r, k) and
Ms = (n− r)〈eτ 〉(1 − 〈eτ 〉) + 6.36
√
(n− r)〈eτ 〉(1− 〈eτ 〉) + r,
〈eτ 〉 = M − 2.33
√
M
2n− r .
(29)
III. THE FINITE KEY EFFECT OF SNS PROTOCOL WITH OPER
A. The SNS protocol and its parameter estimation
We consider the 4-intensity SNS protocol [16, 19]. In this protocol, Alice and Bob send N pulse pairs to Charlie
and get a series of data. In each time window, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses the decoy window or signal window
with probabilities 1− pz and pz respectively. If the decoy window is chosen, Alice (Bob) randomly prepares the pulse
of vacuum state or WCS state |eiθA√µ1〉 or |eiθ′A√µ2〉 (vacuum state, or WCS state |eiθB√µ1〉 or |eiθ′B√µ2〉) with
probabilities p0, p1 and 1 − p0 − p1, respectively, where θA, θ′A, θB and θ′B are different in different windows, and are
random in [0, 2π). If the signal window is chosen, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses bit 1 or 0 (0 or 1) with probabilities ǫ
and 1− ǫ, respectively. If bit 1 (0) is chosen, Alice (Bob) prepares a phase-randomized WCS pulse with intensity µz.
8If bit 0 (1) is chosen, Alice (Bob) prepares a vacuum pulse. This is said to be the sending or not-sending. For Alice
(Bob), bit value 1 (0) is due to her (his) decision on sending out a phase randomized coherent state with intensity µz
for Charlie, while bit value 0 (1) is corresponding to her (his) decision of not-sending, i.e., sending out a vacuum.
Then Alice and Bob send their prepared pulses to Charlie. Charlie is assumed to perform interferometric measure-
ments on the received pulses and announces the measurement results to Alice and Bob. If one and only one detector
clicks in the measurement process, Charlie also tells Alice and Bob which detector clicks, and Alice and Bob take it
as an one-detector heralded event. Alice and Bob repeat the above process for N times and collect all the data with
one-detector heralded events and discard all the others.
The next process is the parameter estimation. To clearly show how this process is carried out, we have the following
definitions.
Definition 2. If both Alice and Bob choose the signal window, it is a Z window. If both Alice and Bob choose
the decoy window, and the states Alice and Bob prepared are in the same intensity and their phases satisfy the
post-selection criterion [21], it is an X window. The one-detector heralded events of X windows and Z windows are
called effective events. And Alice and Bob respectively get nt−bit strings, ZA and ZB, formed by the corresponding
bits of effective events of Z windows.
Definition 3. For an effective event in the Z windows, if it is caused by the event that only one party of Alice and
Bob decides sending out a phase-randomized WCS pulse and he (she) actually sends out a single photon state from
the view point of decoy state method, it is an untagged event. Its corresponding bit is an untagged bit.
Parameter estimation [16, 19, 21]. The data of all the one-detector heralded events except the effective events
of Z windows in this protocol are used to estimate the expected value of the lower bounds of the number of untagged 0-
bits, 〈n01〉, and untagged 1-bits, 〈n10〉. The details of how to estimate the lower bound of 〈n01〉 and 〈n10〉 are shown in
Appendix A. We denote the expected value of the lower bounds of the number of untagged bits as 〈n1〉 = 〈n01〉+〈n10〉.
Also the one-detector heralded events could be used to estimate the expected value of the upper bound of phase-flip
error rate, 〈eph1 〉, of the untagged events. There are two methods to estimate 〈eph1 〉. The first method is shown in
Eq. (A8) of Appendix A, where we apply the Chernoff bound for two times to estimate the upper bound of the first
term and the lower bound of the second term of the numerator, and this is also the methods we use in our prior
articles [16, 19]. The second method is shown in Appendix B, where we apply the improved version of McDiarmid
inequality [79] to the numerator of Eq. (A8). The McDiarmid inequality allows us to treat the numerator as a whole,
and directly get the upper bound of the numerator in a fixed failure probability. This method effectively reduces the
effect of statistical fluctuation of estimating 〈eph1 〉 and improves the key rate especially when the key size is small.
The details of the second method are shown in Appendix B.
B. The data post-processing of SNS protocol
The data post-processing of SNS protocol contains two independent processes: the error correction and the privacy
amplification. The goal of error correction is to correct all the different bits in ZA and ZB. And the privacy
amplification is to distill a shorter but more secure final key from the raw key according to the formula of key rate.
If we directly correct the different bits in ZA and ZB, a large number of raw keys would be cost and decrease the
key rate. The OPER could be used to improve the key rate. And further, we can use the active OPER, which is also
called active odd-parity paring (AOPP) in Ref. [20] to further improve the key rate. And the security of AOPP is
equivalent to the security of OPER [20]. In AOPP, Bob first actively pairs the bits 0 with bits 1 of the raw key string
ZB, and get 2ng pairs, and then randomly splits those pairs into two equal parts. For each part, Alice computes the
parities of those ng pairs and announces them to Bob, then Alice and Bob keep the pairs with parity 1 and discard
the pairs with parity 0. Finally, Alice and Bob randomly keep one bits from those survived pairs and form two new
n′t-bits strings, which would be used to perform error correction and privacy amplification. As shown in Ref. [20],
there is no mutual information between the split two parts and each of those two parts alone could be regarded as
the result of a virtual OPER process performed on unt bits of ZA and ZB, where
u =
ng
nodd
, (30)
where nodd is the number of pairs with odd parity if Bob randomly groups all the bits in ZB two by two, and both ng
and nodd are observed values in practice. Thus we could first get the formula of phase-flip error rate of the survived
untagged bits after OPER, and then apply this formula to each part of AOPP.
In Sec. II, we have shown how to get the phase-flip error rate of the survived untagged bits after OPER, and here
we would show how to get the values of n, k, r and so on in the instance of SNS protocol. The value of n is the number
of untagged bit pairs after random pairing, where the untagged bit pairs are the pairs formed by two untagged bits.
9And we have
n = ϕL(
〈n1〉
nt
〈n1〉
nt
unt
2
), (31)
where ϕL(x) is defined in Eq. (A15). The value of k is the number of neglected untagged bits, thus we can take the
untagged bits that are paired with tagged bits as the neglected bits, thus we have
k = ϕL(u〈n1〉 −
〈n1〉
nt
〈n1〉
nt
unt). (32)
With Eq.(A8), we can get the value of 〈eph1 〉. Particularly, the failure probability of Chernoff bound used in Eq.(A8)
is set as 10−13. And we have
M = ϕU (2n〈eph1 〉), (33)
where ϕU (x) is defined in Eq. (A14) and we also set the failure probability as 10−13, thus εe = 3 × 10−13. All the
failure probabilities of Chernoff bound used in other equations are set as 10−10. We set ε(r, k) = 10−13 and we have
r =
2n+ k
k
ln
3k2
ε(r, k)
. (34)
We set ξτ = 10
−2, ξ˜τ = 10−10, and then we can calculate the value of Ms with Eq.(29). And we have εs = 1.5×10−10.
Finally, we get the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate of the survived untagged bits after OPER with a failure
probability εs = 1.5× 10−10, which is
e′ph1 =
Ms
n′1
, (35)
where n′1 is the number of the survived untagged bits after OPER, and
n′1 = ϕ
L(
〈n01〉
nt
〈n10〉
nt
unt). (36)
With all those values, we now can calculate the key rate R of AOPP with the formulas in Ref. [19], which is
R =
2
N
{n′1[1− h(e′ph1 )]− fn′th(E′)− log2
2
εcor
− 2 log2
1√
2εPAεˆ
}. (37)
where h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the Shannon entropy, E′ is the bit-flip error rate of the remain bits after
AOPP, εcor is the failure probability of error correction, εPA is the failure probability of privacy amplification, and εˆ is
the coefficient while using the chain rules of smooth min- and max- entropy [89]. And we set εcor = εPA = εˆ = 10
−10.
With the formula of Eq. (37), the protocol is 2εtol-secure, and εtol = εcor+εsec, where εsec = 2εˆ+4εs+εPA+εn′
1
+εnk.
Here, εn′
1
is the probability that the real value of the number of survived untagged bits is smaller than n′1, εnk is the
failure probability while we estimated the value of n and k in Eqs. (31) and (32). And we have εn′
1
= 6 × 10−10 for
we use the Chernoff bound for 6 times to estimate n′1, and with the similar reason, we have εnk = 2× 10−10. Finally,
we have εtol = 1.8× 10−9.
IV. THE ASYMMETRIC SNS PROTOCOL WITH OPER AND FINITE KEY EFFECT
In the practical application of SNS protocol, the distance between Alice and Charlie can be different from the
distance between Bob and Charlie. To solve this problem, the theory of asymmetric SNS protocol is proposed in
Ref. [21]. The preparation and measurement step of asymmetric SNS protocol is the same with that of the original
SNS protocol, except the source parameters of Alice and Bob in asymmetric SNS protocol are not the same. In
this part, we use the subscript ′ to indicate Bob’s source parameters. For example, pz is the probability that Alice
chooses the signal window and p′z is the probability that Bob chooses the signal window; µz is the intensity of phase-
randomized WCS if Alice decides sending in her signal windows and µ′z is the intensity of phase-randomized WCS if
Bob decides sending in his signal windows.
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pd ed ηd f αf
1.0× 10−8 3% 30.0% 1.1 0.2
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numerical simulations. Here pd is the dark count rate of Charlie’s detectors;
ed is the misalignment-error probability; ηd is the detection efficiency of Charlie’s detectors; f is the error correction inefficiency;
αf is the fiber loss coefficient (dB/km).
Note that the original SNS protocol [10] and its improved one [20] based on symmetric source parameters for Alice
and Bob, i.e., they use the same values for the sending probabilities and light intensities. As was shown in Ref. [21],
the SNS protocol is also secure with asymmetric source parameters given the following mathematical constraint:
µ1
µ′1
=
ǫ(1− ǫ′)µze−µz
ǫ′(1− ǫ)µ′ze−µ′z
. (38)
With this condition, light intensity chosen by Alice and that chosen by Bob can be different.
After Alice and Bob repeat the preparation and measurement steps of asymmetric SNS protocol for N times, they
can perform the same error correction and privacy amplification steps as shown in Sec. III B. And the formula of key
rate is the same as Eq. (37). The major differences between the original SNS protocol and asymmetric SNS protocol
are the forms of the formulas of the lower bound of the number of untagged bits and the upper bound of phase-flip
error rate, which are shown in the appendix A.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this part, we show the results of numerical simulation of SNS protocol with AOPP, including the symmetric and
asymmetric cases, and compare with the results of the original SNS protocol [19, 21]. The results of this work (A)
are calculated by the methods shown in Appendix A, and the results of this work (B) are calculated by the similar
methods except that we apply the methods shown in Appendix B to estimate the phase-flip error rate. The two
bounds of repeater-less key rate used here are called ’PLOB-1’ and ’PLOB-2’ [80], where PLOB-1 is the absolute
PLOB bound and ’PLOB-2’ is the practical bound.
We use the linear model to simulate the observed values of experiment such as Sκζ which are defined in Appendix
A [19], with the experimental parameters list in Table. I. And the simulation method of ng, n
′
t, nood and E
′ are
shown in Appendix C. Without loss of generality, we assume the property of Charlie’s two detectors are the same.
The distance between Alice and Charlie is LA, and the distance between Bob and Charlie is LB. The total distance
between Alice and Bob is L = LA + LB. In our numerical simulation, we set LA = LB for the symmetric case and
LA − LB =constant for the asymmetric case.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 are our simulation results of this work and Ref. [19] with the experimental parameters list
in Table. I. In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, we set LA = LB and the source parameters of Alice and Bob are all the same. The
dashed brown lines in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 are the results of absolute PLOB bound, which bounds the key rate of repeater-
less QKD with whatever devices, such as perfect detection device. The cyan dashed lines are the results of practical
PLOB bound, which assumes a limited detection efficiency as listed in Table I. The results show that our method
can obviously exceed the absolute PLOB bound. We set N = 1.0× 1011 in Fig. 2, which is a more practical number
of total pulse in experiment, and results show that our method still obviously exceeds the absolute PLOB bound,
while the original SNS protocol just exceeds the absolute PLOB bound a little. The results of applying the improved
version of McDiarmid inequality to estimate the phase-flip error rate are higher about 10% while N = 1.0× 1012 and
about 20% while N = 1.0× 1011 than the methods shown in Appendix A.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 are our simulation results of this work and Ref. [21] with the experimental parameters list
in Table. I. In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we set LA − LB = 100 km. From Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we can clearly see that the our
method in the case of finite key size can greatly improved the key rate of SNS protocol with asymmetric channels,
especially when the channel loss is large.
Table. II is the comparison of the key rates of this work, Refs. [20], [19] and [17], and the PLOB bounds. The
method of Ref. [20] used here are the standard error rejection. The parameters used here is the same as that of
Figure. 2. The key rates show that the method of this work improves the key rate by more than 1 times compared
with our prior work [19], and exceeds the results of Ref. [17, 19] in all distances. Besides, with the method here,
the SNS protocol can by far break the absolute key rate limit of the repeater-less QKD and even reach more than 40
times of the practical PLOB bound and 13 times of the absolute PLOB bound with 1012 pulses.
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FIG. 1: The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus transmission distance (the distance between Alice and Bob) with total number
of pulses N = 1012. Here we set LA = LB and the source parameters of Alice and Bob are all the same. The experimental
parameters that we used in the numerical simulation are listed in Table I. The black solid line is the optimized results of
this work (B). The green solid line is the optimized results of this work (A). And the red solid line is the optimized results of
Ref. [19].
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FIG. 2: The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus transmission distance with total number of pulses N = 1011. Here we set
LA = LB and the source parameters of Alice and Bob are all the same. The experimental parameters that we used in the
numerical simulation are listed in Table I. The black solid line is the optimized results of this work (B). The green solid line is
the optimized results of this work (A). And the red solid line is the optimized results of Ref. [19].
Table. III is the key rates of this work and Ref. [78]. We use the parameters of Ref. [78] in calculations, which are
pd = 3.36× 10−8, ed = 7%, ηd = 20%, αf = 0.185, ξ = 1.69× 10−10, and N = 2.0× 1013 for the distance of 402 km,
and pd = 1.26× 10−8, ed = 9.8%, ηd = 29%, αf = 0.162, ξ = 1.71× 10−10, and N = 2.0× 1013 for the distance of 502
km. The results in Table. III show that the key rates of this work are more than 30 times that of Ref. [78].
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FIG. 3: The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus transmission distance with total number of pulses N = 1012. Here we set
LA − LB = 100 km. The experimental parameters that we used in the numerical simulation are listed in Table I. The black
solid line is the optimized results of this work (B). The green solid line is the optimized results of this work (A). And The red
solid line is the optimized results of Ref. [21].
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FIG. 4: The optimal key rates (per pulse) versus transmission distance with total number of pulses N = 1011. Here we set
LA − LB = 100 km. The experimental parameters that we used in the numerical simulation are listed in Table I. The black
solid line is the optimized results of this work (B). The green solid line is the optimized results of this work (A). And The red
solid line is the optimized results of Ref. [21].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a zigzag approach to verify the phase-flip error of the survived bits after OPER. Based on
this, we can take all the finite key effect efficiently in calculating the non-asymptotic key rate. The numerical results
show that active OPER can greatly improve the key rate of SNS protocol for both the asymmetric and symmetric
channels, and unconditionally break the absolute key rate limit of repeater-less quantum key distribution. Our results
can directly be used to the SNS experiments.
Acknowledgement: We acknowledge the financial support in part by Ministration of Science and Technology of
China through The National Key Research and Development Program of China grant No. 2017YFA0303901; National
Natural Science Foundation of China grant No. 11474182, 11774198 and U1738142.
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key rate 250 km 390 km 420 km 440 km
this work (A) 9.52× 10−6 2.05× 10−7 6.84 × 10−8 2.59× 10−8
this work (B) 1.02× 10−5 2.36× 10−7 8.15 × 10−8 3.26× 10−8
Ref. [20] 4.77× 10−6 1.02× 10−7 3.57 × 10−8 1.49× 10−8
Ref. [19] 5.35× 10−6 7.05× 10−8 4.21 × 10−9 0
Ref. [17] 5.59× 10−6 1.16× 10−8 0 0
PLOB-2 4.33× 10−6 6.86× 10−9 1.72 × 10−9 6.86 × 10−10
PLOB-1 1.44× 10−5 2.29× 10−8 5.74 × 10−9 2.29× 10−9
TABLE II: The key rates of this work, Refs. [20], [19] and [17], and the PLOB bounds. The method of Ref. [20] used here is
the standard error rejection. The parameters used here are the same as that of Figure. 1.
key rate 402 km 502 km
this work (A) 9.98× 10−8 4.82× 10−8
this work (B) 1.07× 10−7 5.38× 10−8
Ref. [78] 1.44× 10−8 1.68× 10−9
TABLE III: The key rates of this work and Ref. [78]. We use the parameters of Ref. [78] in calculations, e.g., the dark count
rate is pd = 3.36 × 10
−8, the misalignment-error probability is ed = 7%, the detection efficiency is ηd = 20%, the fiber loss is
αf = 0.185, the failure probability is ξ = 1.69 × 10
−10, and the total number pulse is N = 2.0 × 1013 for the distance of 402
km, and pd = 1.26× 10
−8, ed = 9.8%, ηd = 29%, αf = 0.162, ξ = 1.71× 10
−10, and N = 2.0× 1013 for the distance of 502 km.
Appendix A: The calculation method
The calculation methods of 〈n01〉, 〈n10〉, and 〈eph1 〉 are similar with that in Refs [16, 19–21]. And the formulas of
asymmetric SNS protocol are more general. We can easily get the formulas of original SNS protocol from that of
asymmetric SNS protocol by setting the same source parameters of Alice and Bob, that is, drop the subscript ′ in the
formulas.
To clearly show the calculation method, we denote Alice’s sources |0〉, |eiθA√µ1〉 and |eiθ′A√µ2〉 as o, x, and y.
Similarly, we denote Bob’s sources |0〉, |eiθB√µ′1〉, and |eiθ′B√µ′2〉 as o′, x′, and y′. We denote the number of pulse
pairs of source κζ(κ = o, x, y; ζ = o′, x′, y′) sent out in the whole protocol as Nκζ , and the total number of one-detector
heralded events of source κζ as nκζ . We define the counting rate of source κζ as Sκζ = nκζ/Nκζ , and the corresponding
expected value as 〈Sκζ〉. With all those definitions, we have
Noo′ ={(1− pz)[(1 − p′z)p0p′0 + p′zp0(1− ǫ′)] + pz(1− p′z)(1 − ǫ)p′0}N
Nox′ =(1 − p′z)p′1[(1− pz)p0 + pz(1− ǫ)]N
Nxo′ =(1 − pz)p1[(1− p′z)p′0 + p′z(1− ǫ′)]N
Noy′ =(1 − p′z)(1− p′0 − p′1)[(1− pz)p0 + pz(1 − ǫ)]N
Nyo′ =(1 − pz)(1− p0 − p1)[(1− p′z)p′0 + p′z(1 − ǫ′)]N
(A1)
As sources x, y, x′, y′ are phase-randomized WCS sources, they are actually the classical mixture of different photon
number states [21]. Thus we can use the decoy-state method to calculate the lower bounds of the expected values of
the counting rate of states |01〉〈01| and |10〉〈10|, which are
〈s01〉 = µ
′2
2 e
µ′1〈Sox′〉 − µ′21 eµ
′
2〈Soy′〉 − (µ′22 − µ′21 )〈Soo′〉
µ′2µ
′
1(µ
′
2 − µ′1)
, (A2)
〈s10〉 = µ
2
2e
µ1〈Sxo′〉 − µ21eµ2〈Syo′〉 − (µ22 − µ21)〈Soo′〉
µ2µ1(µ2 − µ1) . (A3)
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Then we can get the lower bound of the expected value of the counting rate of untagged photons
〈s1〉 = µ1
µ1 + µ′1
〈s10〉+ µ
′
1
µ1 + µ′1
〈s01〉, (A4)
and
〈n10〉 = Npzp′zǫ(1− ǫ′)µze−µz〈s10〉, (A5)
〈n01〉 = Npzp′zǫ′(1 − ǫ)µ′ze−µ
′
z〈s01〉. (A6)
The error counting rate of the X windows where Alice and Bob decide to prepare the pulses with intensities µ1
and µ′1, TX1, can be used to estimate 〈eph1 〉. The criterion of error events in X windows are shown in Ref. [21]. We
denote the number of total pulses with intensities µ1 and µ
′
1 send out in the X windows as NX1, and the number of
corresponding error events as mX1, then we have
TX1 =
mX1
NX1
. (A7)
The upper bound of the expected value of eph1 is given by
〈eph1 〉 =
〈TX1〉 − e−µ1−µ′1〈Soo′〉/2
e−µ1−µ′1(µ1 + µ′1)〈s1〉
, (A8)
where 〈TX1〉 is the expected value of TX1.
The Eqs.(A2)-(A8) are represented by expected values, but the values we get in experiment are observed values.
To close the gap between the expected values and observed values, we need Chernoff bound [71, 90]. Let X denote
the sum of n independent random variables with outcomes 0 or 1. φ is the expected value of X . We have
φL(X ) = X
1 + δ1(X ) , (A9)
φU (X ) = X
1− δ2(X ) , (A10)
where we can obtain the values of δ1(X ) and δ2(X ) by solving the following equations(
eδ1
(1 + δ1)1+δ1
) X
1+δ1
=
ξ
2
, (A11)(
e−δ2
(1 − δ2)1−δ2
) X
1−δ2
=
ξ
2
, (A12)
where ξ is the failure probability. Thus we have
φL(NαβSαβ) = Nαβ〈Sαβ〉, φU (NαβSαβ) = Nαβ〈Sαβ〉. (A13)
Besides, we can use the Chernoff bound to help us estimate their real values from their expected values. Similar to
Eqs. (A9)- (A12), the observed value, ϕ, and its expected value, Y, satisfy
ϕU (Y) = [1 + δ′1(Y)]Y, (A14)
ϕL(Y) = [1− δ′2(Y)]Y, (A15)
where we can obtain the values of δ′1(Y) and δ′2(Y) by solving the following equations(
eδ
′
1
(1 + δ′1)1+δ
′
1
)Y
=
ξ
2
, (A16)
(
e−δ
′
2
(1− δ′2)1−δ′2
)Y
=
ξ
2
. (A17)
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Appendix B: The improved version of McDiarmid inequality
In this part, we show how to apply the improved version of McDiarmid inequality [79] to the numerator of Eq. (A8).
We can rewrite the formula of 〈TX1〉 as 〈TX1〉 =
∑NX1
j=1 W˜j/NX1 where the value of W˜j is 1 (0) if the jth pulse
of source xx causes (dose not cause) a wrong effective event. And similarly we can rewrite the formula of 〈Soo′〉
as 〈Soo′〉 =
∑N
oo′
j=1 W˜
′
j/Noo′ where the value of W˜
′
j is 1 (0) if the jth pulse of source oo
′ causes (dose not cause) an
effective event. Besides, we denote nT = mX1 + noo′ and ST = nT /(NX1 +Noo′), then we have
〈TX1〉 − e−µ1−µ
′
1〈Soo′〉/2
=
N
oo′∑
j=1
W˜ ′j
Noo′
+
e−µ1−µ
′
1
2
N
oo′∑
j=1
W˜ ′j
Noo′
=
ST
nT
nT∑
j=1
Wj ,
(B1)
where the value of Wj is randomly A1 or A2, and A1 =
NX1+Noo′
NX1
, A2 = −NX1+Noo′2Noo′ e
−µ1−µ′1 .
According to the Corollary 1 in Ref. [79], the true value of
∑nT
j=1Wj is larger than its observed value by
[nT ln (1/ξ)/2]
1
2 (A1 −A2) with probability at most ξ. Finally, we have
〈eph1 〉 =
TX1 − e−µ1−µ′1Soo′/2 + ∆
e−µ1−µ′1(µ1 + µ′1)〈s1〉
, (B2)
where
∆ =
ST
nT
[
nT ln (1/ξ)
2
]
1
2 (A1 −A2). (B3)
Appendix C: The simulation method of ng , n
′
t, nood and E
′
Let nc0 be the number of effective events in the Z window that Alice decides not sending and Bob decides sending,
nc1 be the number of effective events in the Z window that Alice decides sending and Bob decides not sending, nv be
the number of effective events in the Z window that both Alice and Bob decides not sending, nd be the number of
effective events in the Z window that both Alice and Bob decides sending. We have
ng = min(
nc0
2
+
nd
2
,
nc1
2
+
nv
2
),
n′t =
nc0
nc0 + nd
nc1
nc1 + nv
ng +
nd
nc0 + nd
nv
nc1 + nv
ng,
nodd =
(nc0 + nd)(nc1 + nv)
nc0 + nc1 + nv + nd
,
E′ =
nvnd
nc0nc1 + nvnd
.
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